RTN TO HOME PAGE

In 1987, Australia experienced at least 32 homicides in a total of at least six multiple-killing incidents—including the Hoddle Street and Queen Street (Melbourne, Victoria) "massacres."  In a December "gun summit," immediately after the Queen Street incident, Australian Prime Minister Hawke, the state premiers, and the Chief Minister of the Northern Territory agreed to establish and fund a "national committee on violence" (NCV).

On July 7 of the next year (1988) the director of the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), a professor Duncan Chappell, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on behalf of the AIC and, hence, the Australian federal (commonwealth) government.  The other party to (signer of) the agreement was a Margaret Anstee, head of the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, a subsidiary of the U.N.

The AIC is part of the commonwealth government, and has been important in the Australian gun control arena, as we will see.

Rather than addressing a need to scientifically investigate the relationships between different kinds of violence and private possession of firearms, a matter that had hardly been studied at the time, the agreement between the branch center and the AIC declared a need to severely restrict the private possession of firearms in Australia, and described a dozen or so measures to be undertaken—such as registering members of all gun clubs and banning all self-loading centerfire rifles and shotguns.

The National Committee on Violence (NCV) met in October, 1988.  The chairman of the committee was the same Professor Duncan Chappell, director of the AIC.  He and the AIC no doubt provided much useful or necessary "information" to the committee.  The committee made over 130 recommendations for violence reduction in its report, Violence:  Directions for Australia (not available on the web) published in 1990 by the AIC.  The recommendations included 25 along the lines of "gun control."¹

The NCV gun control recommendations were similar to what had been described in the AIC-UN MoU, but not the same.  According to Australian Parliamentary Library "Current Issues Brief" 16 1995-96, the recommendations included, among other things:  ban on import of "military" weapons; ban sale of surplus military weapons; establishment of a computerized national firearms registry; "restrictions" on possession of semi-automatic firearms; licensing as a prerequisite to firearm possession; a "cooling off" period; and mandatory storage standards.

As the proposals looked when funneled through the gun control media to the public, they were generally such as would seem quite reasonable to people who themselves had no interest in firearm possession or knew little about the connections between firearms and violence—or were naïvely trustful of government or accustomed to control by governors.  We often see that "the devil is in the details" and the details are never in the generalizations publicized by our gun-controlling politicians.

Enter the Australasian Police Ministers Council (APMC).  The council was a committee of top law enforcement representatives (ministers) from the commonwealth government and each of the states and territories.  From the name of the council it appears that the council was at least intended to include representatives of one or more neighboring (asian) countries too.  The council had entertained firearm "reform" in 1987 and again in 1990 according to the Australia "buyback" web site "history" page, which also indicates that commonwealth governments (leadership) prior to the one that came to power in 1996 had been unsuccessful in their efforts to bring the Australian states and territories together to implement "effective" nationwide firearms controls.  Note that this history implies that it was a given that such controls were needed.

In 1989, the state of New South Wales (NSW) passed its Firearms Act of 1989, so NSW had firearm registration, owner licensing and virtual gun bans starting in 1990.  The next year the state of Queensland passed its Firearms Act of 1990, so some kind of owner licensing began there the next year ('91).  Handguns and fully automatic firearms had been severely restricted almost throughout Australia for several years already.

In August, 1990 five people were shot to death with a shotgun in Surrey Hills, Sydney, NSW.  A year later, on August 17, 1991, a 20-year-old young man shot and killed six people, stabbed to death another, then killed himself with his semiauto rifle in a shopping plaza in the Sydney, NSW suburb of Strathfield.  Note that carnage was being produced with firearms more lethal than handguns since having a handgun was extremely difficult because of past preoccupation with restricting handguns.  Note too that these two high-profile "mass" killings occurred in NSW after NSW instituted much tighter restriction of long gun possession.

After the mid-August Strathfield incident, the NSW parliament quickly established a "joint select committee upon gun law reform"  The term "select" apparently did not refer to qualifications of the legislators (ministers) who participated, as at least one of them was qualified only by her father and brothers having once been hunters.  The committee quickly put together a set of recommendations which were accepted by the cabinet before mid-November.¹  The committee must have received some help from someone to get so much done in so little time, especially with unqualified participants.

Before '91 was done, NSW amended its firearms act 1989 to make changes recommended by the committee—including prohibition of firearms possession by a person under a domestic violence restraining order (called an "apprehended violence order," or AVO, in NSW) which might be issued without existence of any violence, and would result in prohibition of gun possession for ten years after the end of the order AND with no possibility of judicial discretion.

In a 1991 police ministers meeting, again according to the parliamentary library current issues brief, the ministers considered the need for uniform national firearms laws, one of the NCV recommendations, and reportedly reached a "concensus" based on the recommendations of the NSW "select" committee.¹  Later cooperation of the AIC with the council indicates that the AIC was probably involved with the council at this time as well.  Recommendations for "reform" were drawn up as a result of the 1991 meeting.  According to a '99 AIC document, sale of "military style" rifles was banned, starting about '92, in all states but Tasmania and Queensland.²

The next year, on October 27, 1992 a man shot to death six people in three towns north of Sydney on the central coast of (again) NSW.  On August 26, 1993, three people were shot dead by a man in another suburb of Sydney, NSW (again).

At its meeting in May 1995, the police ministers council noted the "varying registration and licensing systems applicable to firearms and firearm ownership within the States and Territories to control the use of firearms."  It established a team with members from each jurisdiction, and coordinated by the Victoria police minister, to "identify mechanisms which would achieve uniformity" (i.e., "like the most restrictive states") in a number of areas, including:  a system to control mail order sales; uniform standards for training prerequisite to licensing; uniform standards for security/storage; and a uniform approach to pistol registration.  The Victoria minister reported on subcommittee activity in the 10 Nov 95 council meeting and further consideration was set for their February 1996 meeting.³  It has also been reported that a commonwealth representative presented a proposal at this meeting.

At this time gun laws or their enforcement were apparently most restrictive in NSW and Western Australia and least restrictive in the states of Tasmania and Queensland, although it appears that Queensland had quite restrictive law and it is hard to tell for sure based on the conflicting and incomplete information from newspapers and gun controllers on the one hand and gun rights activists on the other.

Tasmania had passed their Guns Act 1991, and its restrictions apparently began January 1, 1993.  These restrictions included requirements that a person have a license for possession of a firearm, and that handguns be registered.  After the restrictions began, use of firearms in assaults increased somewhat steadily for four years (through '96).  Firearm suicide rates dropped from the peak they had reached in '92, back down to pre-92 levels, and so did overall suicide rates.  The drop, then, was caused only by the '92 peak rather than the guns act.  No trend can be discerned regarding homicide in the time period because the numbers were too small and variable for any reasonable level of statistical significance.

In early '96, Australia had been having some bad social and economic problems for several years.  Inflation had been very high throughout the 1980s.⁴  Major banks had failed in 1991.⁵  There had been a large influx of immigrants from Asia.  Both Asians and Australian aborigines thought themselves poorly treated and had demonstrated against discrimination toward them.⁵

Unemployment had been very high for several years.^1,4  Relative poverty, an indication of inequity within the society, was very high, exceeding that of Canada, England and New Zealand and exceeded notably by the considerably higher relative poverty in the U.S.A.⁶  Alcoholism, unemployment, poverty, crime, etc. were very high among aborigines.  Youth unemployment was very high.  The portion of households with only one parent had been increasing fast for several years.⁷  Productive (manufacturing and natural resource) industry had been in decline for years.  [Note that several of the problems just described are generally accepted as being strongly contributing causes for most types of violence and suicide.]

The public was naturally unhappy with the state of affairs, which they naturally blamed on their government.  A federal (commonwealth) election was called for, so the February 1996 police council meeting was postponed.³  A new federal government was formed, headed by John Howard.  An issue to distract the public from real issues, and serve as a unifying force, would certainly be helpful at this point.

In January, 1996 seven people were shot dead in a Brisbane, Queensland suburb.  Then, on 28 April 1996, 32 people were shot to death, 19 were seriously injured, and three others were otherwise killed near Port Arthur, Tasmania.  The public was immediately whipped into a gun control frenzy by the press, the medical community, the Australian branches of the international gun control cartel, the commonwealth government (including their "institute of criminology") and others.  Although polls done prior to the massacre indicated that the public was satisfied with the amount of "gun control" they already had, a major newspaper did a poll just a few days after the massacre (while all minds were "clear") and, not surprisingly, found high levels of support for extreme gun control measures.  This poll would be used forever by the commonwealth government and other gun controllers to claim that Australians supported the new gun laws to come.

Within ten days after the massacre, the research staff of the commonwealth's parliamentary library finished a report about the "gun problem" for the enlightenment and guidance of the gun-ignorant representatives (ministers) to parliament.  Or, was the report just waiting for addition of a release date when the massacre occurred?  This report³ had some valid and useful information about history and options for forcing uniform gun control.  It also had much misinformation and blattantly biased statements about "military-style" firearms, their lethality and evidence suggesting that increased firearms possession might cause increased violence—specifically, a study by Martin Killias for the U.N. Interregional Crime (and Justice) Research Institute (UNICRI).

Within another three days, the police ministers held an emergency "special" meeting on 10 May 1996 (attended by at least one gun control proponent from New Zealand) and approved a gun ban program.   The program was virtually ready and waiting at the time of the meeting although it may have been adjusted some.  Additional resolutions were added in meetings on July 17 and November 15.  The state parliaments would have to pass some laws in order to fully implement all the agreed changes, but some changes were made immediately.  For example, the Tasmanian police minister thought that the existing Tasmanian Guns Act 1991 gave him authority to require registration of certain semiautomatic centerfire firearms, so he issued an order to do so on May 7, 1996 (even before the 10 May APMC meeting).

The new laws would virtually ban private possession of pump-action shotguns and all semiautomatic firearms (even of .22 rimfire caliber) and provide for the government to pay people over the course of a year (up through September, 1997) to turn in such firearms for destruction.  The money for this was to come from a 1-year increase in the "medicare" tax (this particular tax partly to solidify the public acceptance of guns being a "public health" issue).  The laws would provide for a person to possess a non-military semiautomatic long gun, or pump action shotgun, for professional use only if the authorities could be convinced that the person had a "genuine need."  A "genuine reason" (to the authorities' mind) was required for a person to have a lesser firearm.  And protection of life was not to be a valid reason for having a firearm.

The official Australian buyback web site history page says that the agreement was the result of "detailed preparation and extensive consultation (i.e., conspiracy) over many years."  A representative of the Australian Press Council was a participant in a February, 1997 symposium [.pdf file] of gun control advocates, convened by the Dept. of Public Health and Family Services, to plan "public health approaches to firearm violence."  Does anyone doubt that the Australian press was already prepared to keep the public convinced of the need for gun control when the Port Arthur massacre occurred ten months before?

There was objection by people (basically gun owners) who were concerned about losing their right to have firearms, but resistance was divided.  Many gun owners and their representatives made statements accepting some of the restrictions and the basic concept that their governments could or should restrict based upon someone's idea of what need people might have for one kind of firearm or another.  A huge demonstration (150,000) occurred in Melbourne.  At least one other large (8000+) demonstration occurred in Brisbane, Queensland on June 29, 1996, but the media basically ignored these other demonstrations.

Most politicians caved in quickly to the media onslaught.  The AIC and the media worked on maintaining high support for the new gun laws.  On November 4, 1996 the AIC released "Violent Deaths and Firearms in Australia:  Data & Trends."  About 70 percent of this 96-page report (RPP04) is about firearm deaths.  The rest is about Australian homicide over the years.  On the same day the AIC also issued a media release entitled "Lax firearm laws mean more deaths."

The actual report is a generally professional statistical analysis with some scattered bias, like constantly referring to "firearm caused" deaths.  But the media release was blatantly biased and drew unwarranted conclusions about firearms prevalence and death rates.

The media release opened by declaring that the AIC report "shows that Australian states in which guns have been more easily available have significantly higher death rates than the national average"—and listing 1994 firearm (not total) death rates for the states and territories.  The media release title and opening statement tried to make the public think something about deaths in general although the material was only about those deaths in which firearms were the instruments used to cause such deaths.

Then, among findings mentioned, the media release stated that the firearms death rate had fallen over the past decade "as legislation of the late 1980s in some states has made firearms somewhat more difficult to obtain," that "those states in which firearms regulation and licensing have been less stringent have had significantly higher [gun} death rates than the national average" and that the usual small group of countries have less gun homicides than the USA because the USA has more guns.  All these statements were attempts to make the public think that the legislation in some states and countries had reduced gun death rates and that states/countries with less stringent control had higher death rates as a result, ignoring the possibility that the higher and lower gun death rates might be caused by something other than gun laws or gun prevalence.  The report actually had no facts upon which to base such conclusions.  Note that the AIC switched to addressing homicide rather than total deaths when discussing international comparisons since some of the countries have higher suicide rates than the USA.

The media release used the usual gun controller tricks of addressing "firearm" deaths, and also including accidents and suicides.  They focus on "firearm" deaths/injuries because they can always show reductions in these if firearm availability is reduced, even though total deaths and injuries are not affected and such availability reductions might actually cause more deaths/injuries than they prevent.  They include accidents and suicides in their discussions because Australia has so few firearm murders and other homicides that the numbers and rates would not tend to upset people much, especially in comparison to other types that are much more numerous.  Also, because the numbers are so small, they vary a great deal randomly from one year to the next so that a plot will not clearly show a definite trend over time.

Gun controllers are able to upset the public much more by including suicides in their death figures.  What the gun controllers don't want people to know is that it has been proven (and confirmed) that reducing the prevalence of firearms does not reduce (total) suicide rates even though it does in fact reduce firearm suicide rates.  People wanting to commit suicide simple use another tool/method when a firearm is not available.  [Doctors typically don't believe this because they know that a firearm is more certain to kill than some other methods that are frequently used, and they've told each other that some large portion of suicides are impulsive, spur of the moment events.  What they fail to account for is that there is no shortage of equally deadly methods, and a person who fails in a suicide attempt is very likely just to try again and again (often without others even knowing) until he or she succeeds.]

The truth is that the claim about availability was unfounded from a scientific research standpoint.  The report had not even addressed "availability" in the various states, even by reference to some existing analysis, much less quantified it.  (They couldn't reference an analysis because there had not been one.)

What the data in the report actually showed (in combination with what GunsAndCrime.org has been able to learn about gun laws in the late '80s and early '90s) was that:

1. The "gun death" rate for NSW rose progressively for three years after effectivity ('90) of the NSW Firearms Act 1989, before finally falling for just the last two years of the period (meaning the gun death rate reduction was not caused by the law);
2. The final drop in the NSW gun death rate did occur upon effectivity of the major '91 amendments to the law, but this was only for two years (not enough to qualify as a statistically significant trend) and the pattern actually resulted from a rather random combination of ups and downs of gun homicide and gun accidents added to a minor drop in gun suicides.
3. The gun death rate for Tasmania showed no statistically significant change in the two years of effectivity ('93 & '94) of the Tasmania Guns Act 1991, and the small reduction was entirely the result of the rate being artificially high in '92 because of an abnormally high suicide rate for that year (i.e., there was no reason to think that the law had any impact on gun death rate); and,
4. Only Queensland had a sustained decline that started with the effectivity of its new gun law, the Firearms Act 1990, and extending through '94.

Click here for details on what the report actually showed about "gun" deaths from 1983 through 1994 in the different states.

SUMMARY:  The international comparisons are completely bogus because they selectively address only a few countries, because they ignore the many significant differences between the countries, and because they ignore the fact that some of the countries had still lower death rates in the past when they had more firearms.  Firearm injury death rates in the different states, and percentages of deaths that involve firearms, are irrelevant because there is no reason to think that death rates (overall) go down just because firearm death rates go down.  It is entirely possible that anything that causes firearm death rates to drop might also cause overall death rates to rise.  Focusing on firearm deaths is just a gun controller way to sway the uninformed by impressing them with numbers and taking advantage of their inability to understand statistical information.

Even if firearm death rates were accepted as a valid measure of violence, the firearm death rate history for the decade preceding the report does not consistently support the claims made in the press release (for the three states for which GunsAndCrime.org has been able to find information about effectivity of laws and amendments that were claimed to have reduced firearm deaths).

Follow this link to learn details about THE RESULTS OF THE BAN/BUYBACK AND/OR NEW LAWS.

It will be nearly impossible to ever know whether any effects that may be isolated are caused by the buyback (reduction of firearm prevalence) on the one hand or by one part or another of the various laws and regulations passed as part of the overall program.  This is because all these things began at virtually the same time throughout the country as a consequence of instituting a comprehensive nationwide program.

The effects of the new laws and ban/buyback on crime rates can not be clear for at least two reasons.  First, it is entirely likely that any changes observed in crime rate trends could be results of things unrelated to the laws and ban/buyback—and there is no shortage of things that are widely known to affect crime rates.  Second, some of the significant crime rates dropped (or increased by smaller amounts) in '99 and 2000 rather than continuing the bad "trends" of the previous two years.

Had the '99 rates continued the trends barely started in '97 or even '98, one could have reason to believe that the trends were started by the laws (that began about '97) or by the ban/buyback (that ended in '97) or by something else that happened in '96 or '97.  No clear trend started immediately after the ban/buyback since crime rates went up in '98 but then went down in '99 and 2000.

Because the '99 and 2000 rates didn't continue the bad trends barely begun in '98 for other than assault, we probably won't be able to substantiate that the laws and buyback caused anything bad—but the gun controllers also will have a hard time substantiating that the laws/buyback caused anything good.  To do either, it would be necessary to account for all other factors that could be responsible for any observed changes, and do so for several years including '96 and '97 (and several years after).  Because of the effect being delayed so much from the supposed cause, it will be impossible for gun controllers to legitimately claim any beneficial effect without doing so.

One can't say anything legitimate about the effects of the buyback and new laws on suicide and accidental death at this point because the latest available data is for only '98.  Even with data for '99 we can barely make guesses about the effect on crime rates.  We will need data at least for '99 to do the same about suicide.  Even more will be required regarding accidental deaths since the numbers are so low and erratic from year to year.

However, one thing is certain.  The ban/buyback was accompanied by no definite, obvious improvement in crime, suicide or accidental deaths.

The Australian governments, media and other gun controllers continue to insist that the new laws and the ban/buyback are successful and that the results will someday show this.  The official buyback site Q&A page has a question, "Are there statistics on firearm use in Australia?"  In addition to a few inoccuous stats, the Commonwealth reply re-assured the public with, "In a household where a firearm is kept, it is 48 times more likely that the firearm will be used to kill a member of the household than an intruder."

This is an incorrrect, ignorant mistatement of the results of the first ('86) junk study by Kellermann.  The actual number was "42.7," which gun controllers naturally rounded up to "43."  One has to wonder if they were thinking right from the beginning that this would allow them later to make the "innocent, natural mistake" of misreading the number as "48."

And the number did not apply to the ratio of household members to intruders.  Basically, the Commonwealth got the whole thing wrong.  But, they can get away with it because the public is both ignorant on the subject and trusting of their governors.

Are the Australia gun controllers finally happy?  It is important for Americans to realize not only how the current gun control happened in Australia, but also that the gun control organizations in Australia aren't satisfied even with the extreme "control" they've obtained.  They're pushing hard for even more.

SO, HOW DID IT HAPPEN?

If the cancer can be stopped in the USA, there is hope for eventually removing it in much of the world (including Australia) even if some countries in the mean time have total bans.  We still have a lot of free exchange of information.  The challenge is to get citizens to care enough to read or listen.

The situation in Australia could still be turned around if, through persistent effort, the public there is educated on the issues.  Australians have been conditioned from the beginning of the campaign to reject anything from the USA unless it comes from gun controllers.  This was done by astutely denegrating the USA and it's "frontier gun culture" with a public relations theme of "We don't really want to be like America in this."  This was continued with a campaign attacking the "evil NRA" abouts its criticism after the buyback.  [Australians reading this paper are invited to respond with suggestions about what GunsAndCrime.org (or Americans) might do to help (besides "telling all" to all.)]

PARTING SHOT:  In the USA, gun controllers work at keeping people from knowing about criminologists.  They try hard to ignore criminologists and keep the media full of reports on the junk studies done by the medical gun controllers.  In Australia the AIC years ago assumed the mantle of "criminologists."  The role of the AIC in connection with gun control in Australia has been to use statistical methods, the government's prestige, and the peoples' money to produce scientific-looking propaganda. From the quality of some documents at the AIC web site, and the fact that they reference the junk science by such as Killias and Kellermann, one would think that the staff of AIC are medical doctors who "know best what is best for the common people," or just statisticians with prejudice against firearms.

AIC staff and others at the 1997 symposium of gun control advocates to plan "public health approaches to firearm violence" thought that the Kellermann "43 times" junk study should be replicated in Australia, and that something needed to be done to get accurate information about the numbers of firearms Australians have.  They're too ignorant of the body of criminological knowledge about firearms to realize that the Kellermann study is worthless except as propaganda, and that the gun laws they supported have made it impossible for anyone ever to know how many guns Australians have (without sending authorities to exhaustively search all properties) because the laws cause people to falsely deny possession of firearms except registered firearms.

The AIC web site has a lot of useful information.  But use it with caution.  Be alert for anti-gun bias.  You can bet that if any info at their site would support an anti-control argument, it is only because they don't understand well enough to realize it.

The three parliamentary library authors of the brief provided to parliament should not be blamed for the fact that the Killias "study" was junk science.  After all, they were doing a report on things they basically knew nothing about—and they might not even be able to understand an explanation of the deficiencies of the study.  But people whose jobs are to do research on available information for guidance of ignorant politicians should be expected to know that any one study cannot be considered proof of anything, especially before qualified people have critiqued the study.  The authors should have searched out and summarized all available data on the topic, which has life and death consequences.  If little evidence is available, that should be stated.  If such meager evidence is summarized, a warning of the inconclusive nature of the evidence should be included.

RTN TO TOP OF PAGE

END NOTES

  1. Jennifer Gardiner (minister) in 12 Nov 91 speech to NSW parliament.
  2. Jenny Mouzos, Firearm Related Violence:
     The Impact of the Nationwide Agreement on Firearms,
      (Australia, Australian Institute of Criminology,
      May, 1999) p/o "Trends & Issues" series (T&I 116) (PDF file)
  3. Jennifer Norberry, Derek Woolner & Kirsty Magarey,
      After Port Arthur - Issues of Gun Control in Australia,
      Current Issues Briefs, 16 1995-96 (Canberra, ACT, Australia:
      Australian Parliamentary Library, May 7, 96)
  4. Australia Parliamentary Library Historical Supplement
      to the Monthly Economic and Social Indicators (MESI)
  5. Compton's Interactive Encyclopedia 2.01VWF ('94)
  6. Peter Saunders, "Poverty and Deprivation in Australia," Year
      Book Australia reproduced as p/o "Australia Now" series at ABS
      web site (Canberra, Australia: Australian Bur. of Stats, 1996)
  7. Australian social trends 1997, ABS (cat. No. 4102.0)
  8. Gary Kleck, Targeting Guns—Firearms and Their Control
      (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1997) p.253-254.